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Strategic Interactions between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in a Multi-Country New-Keynesian Model of a Monetary Union
Michalak, Tomasz; Engwerda, Jacob; Plasmans, Joseph - CESifo - 2009
In this paper we consider a number of key issues related to the policy coordination in a monetary union that has been recently discussed in the literature. To this end we propose a multi-country New-Keynesian model of a monetary union cast in the framework of linear quadratic differential games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405711
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Structural Distortions and Decentralized Fiscal Policies in EMU
Beetsma, Roel; Bovenberg, Lans - CESifo - 2001
The combination of discretionary monetary policy, labor-market distortions and nominal wage rigidity yields an inflation bias as monetary policy tries to exploit nominal wage contracts to address labour-market distortions Although an inflation target eliminates this inflation bias, it creates a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765964
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Has the EMU Reduced Wage Growth and Unemployment? Testing a Model of Trade Union Behaviour
Mikosch, Heiner; Sturm, Jan-Egbert - CESifo - 2011
(EMU) led to lower wage growth and lower unemployment in participating countries. Following Grüner’s model, monetary …. Although we come up with some weak evidence for increased business cycle amplitudes within the EMU, we neither find a … significant general effect of the EMU on wage growth nor on unemployment. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009020101
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Fiscal Multipliers and the Choice of Zero Lower Bound Modeling
Siemsen, Thomas; Watzka, Sebastian - CESifo - 2013
In this note we elaborate on the effect of the modeling choice of the zero lower bound on the size of the fiscal multiplier. To this end we contrast two different ways to implement the ZLB in a New Keynesian model: the ZLB modeled as an endogenous central bank reaction to a contractionary demand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681227
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Sovereign Default Risk and Banks in a Monetary Union
Uhlig, Harald - CESifo - 2013
This paper seeks to understand the interplay between banks, bank regulation, sovereign default risk and central bank guarantees in a monetary union. I assume that banks can use sovereign bonds for repurchase agreements with a common central bank, and that their sovereign partially backs up any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877795
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Too many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy
Berger, Helge; Nitsch, Volker - CESifo - 2008
How many people should decide about monetary policy? In this paper, we take an empirical perspective on this issue, analyzing the relationship between the number of monetary policy decision-makers and monetary policy outcomes. Using a new data set that characterizes Monetary Policy Committees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766195
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Central Bank Boards around the World: Why does Membership Size Differ?
Berger, Helge; Nitsch, Volker; Lybek, Tonny - CESifo - 2007
This paper analyzes empirically differences in the size of central bank boards across countries. Defining a board as the body that changes monetary instruments to achieve a specified target, we discuss the possible determinants of a board’s size. The empirical relevance of these factors is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181616
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Hypnosis Before Wake-up Call?! The Revival of Sovereign Credit Risk Perception in the EMU-Crisis
Bordon, Ingo G.; Schmid, Kai D.; Schmidt, Michael - CESifo - 2014
the Maastricht treaty, the EMU convergence era, and the financial crisis. In detail, we find: (i) Since the 1980s the role … treaty, and again with the wake-up call due to the onset of the financial crisis. (ii) Before the financial crisis EMU member …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010888450
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The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics of Greek-type Crises in the EMU
Fahrholz, Christian; Wójcik, Cezary - CESifo - 2010
analysis suggests that, given EMU’s present political-economic set-up, i) the bail-out was unavoidable, ii) the lengthy process … with a future moral hazard problem. Based on our analysis, we suggest that the EMU’s institutional design could be improved … processes as well as the conditions and parameters on which the scope and limits of fiscal redistribution in EMU depends. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671732
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Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-Federal Jurisdictions
Schaltegger, Christoph A.; Feld, Lars P. - CESifo - 2004
The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending and indebtedness in political economics. The more fragmented a government, the higher its spending, deficits and debt. In this paper we investigate to what extent this problem can be mitigated by different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094240