standard voting model, we show that information is aggregated in large committees provided disesteem payoffs are not overly … behalf of society. In addition to a payoff linked to the adequateness of the committee’s decision, each expert receives a … disesteem payoff if he/she voted in favor of an ill-fated innovation. An example is FDA committees, where committee members can …

Using voting data from the Bank of England, we show that different individual assessments of the economy strongly …. Counterfactual analysis shows that committees add value through aggregating private assessments, but that gains to larger committees … their assessments also have lower precision, mixed committees may not be optimal. …

This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule …. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in the spirit of Condorcet, a symmetric composition of committees is not always … committees. However, in the special case of only two skill levels, it is optimal to compose the committees evenly. …

understanding of this form of costly punishment to help explain a puzzle of voting behavior: why do people who are indifferent … between two potential policy outcomes of an election participate in large-scale elections when voting is costly? Using a … simple voting experiment, we show that many voters are willing to engage in voting as a form of punishment, even when voting …

productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to …