Showing 1 - 10 of 242
This paper analyses the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) under uncertainty, focusing on the role of learning and risk aversion. It bridges two strands of literature: one focused on the role learning for the success of IEA formation when countries are risk neutral and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010736746
externalities and so, the option exercise by the Leader generates an “Information Revelation” that benefits the Follower. Moreover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013067
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094193
We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this … information on the joint production process. Once individual information is shared, team members decide individually on the effort … such that team members communicate their private information and exert efficient productive efforts on the basis of this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010812489
How should we evaluate the welfare implications of improvements to safety technologies in the presence of offsetting behavior? We model this problem as a symmetric game in which each player’s payoff depends on his own action and the average action of the other players, and analyze under which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010772269
In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416121
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194236
-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278134
This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010889983
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779412