aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

candidate is expectations: what people expect could affect how they feel about what actually occurs. In a real-effort experiment …

risk and typically need to assume stability of these characteristics over time and across decision domains. We test the … reliability of two choice tasks for eliciting discount rates, risk aversion, and probability weighting and assess the stability of … largely uncorrelated with decisions in other important life domains involving intertemporal trade-offs and risk. …

predicted, we find in a laboratory public goods experiment a robust association between stronger self-control and higher levels …

goods, where prices are regulated by an authority, physicians act as experts. Due to their informational advantage …

outcomes, thus ignoring possible repercussions. We present a field experiment in which we consider a phenomenon that we call …

behavior by sellers. This paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to …

private firm. We solve analytically for the Kantian equilibrium of this lobbying game together with the majority voting … more concentrated among the top productivity individuals, their increased lobbying effort generates efficiency as well as …

In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D ….C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes … level of commercial lobbying services is typically socially inefficient, and characterize the nature of the distortions …