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The assumption that payoff-relevant information is observable but not verifiable is important for many core results in contract, organizational and institutional economics. However, subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms - which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010889984
In this paper we test the AK model of growth with laboratory experiments. In each period, agents produce and trade …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009651181
Social preferences and social influence effects (“peer effects”) are well documented, but little is known about how peers shape social preferences. Settings where social preferences matter are often situations where peer effects are likely too. In a gift-exchange experiment with independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010757729
More often than not production processes are the joint endeavor of people having different abilities and productivities. Such production processes and the associated surplus production are often not fully transparent in the sense that the relative contributions of involved agents are blurred;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511615
. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583651
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to test the extent to which Moore and Repullo’s subgame perfect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257671
-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to … allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and … alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011205382
(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders’ payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877664
We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877748
-off, a hybrid share auction that includes a (possibly negative) cash reward to the winner, a minimum share, and an option to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877882