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Aytimur, R. Emre; Boukouras, Aristotelis; Schwager, Robert - CESifo - 2012

characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting … does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively … related to the size of the local community and the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416121

Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights

Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne; Schmidt, Klaus - CESifo - 2005

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765975

Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries

Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - CESifo - 2013

We revisit the classical result that financing a pure public good through taxation of private consumption is inefficient. To this standard setup we add a consumption contest in which consumers can win a prize. We show that an appropriately chosen contest—which we call a ‘tax lottery’—can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877710

Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link

Arce, Daniel G.; Dan Kovenock J.; Roberson, Brian - CESifo - 2009

In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013950

A Theory of Government Procrastination

Furusawa, Taiji; Lai, Edwin L.-C. - CESifo - 2011

We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of its present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. We show that under a two-party political system the party in office tends to be present-biased. This may lead to inefficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399664

The Eurozone Needs Exit Rules

Fahrholz, Christian; Wójcik, Cezary - CESifo - 2012

This paper argues that the key issue for defining and solving the Eurozone’s (EZ) difficulties lies in readjusting the relationship between the centre and the periphery of the EZ. Our argument proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the basic finance problem of a centre-periphery system is captured by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010553271

Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control

Siemens, Ferdinand von - CESifo - 2011

Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278134

Democracy, Inequality and the Environment when Citizens can Mitigate Privately or Act Collectively

Bernard, Sophie; Hotte, Louis; Winer, Stanley L. - CESifo - 2010

We study the political economy of the environment in autocratic, weak and strong democracies when individuals can either mitigate the health consequences of domestic pollution privately or reduce pollution collectively through public policy. The setting is that of a small open economy in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727301

How to Share it out: The Value of Information in Teams

Gershkov, Alex; Li, Jianpei; Schweinzer, Paul - CESifo - 2014

We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes—a ‘team’—as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010812489

The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?

Leininger, Wolfgang; Ockenfels, Axel - CESifo - 2008

none

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181276

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