aspect of the services of experts (e.g., of doctors, lawyers, and accountants), and the role that voluntary pro bono work … might play. Expert services have un- verifiable quality to non-experts and are subject to moral hazard. Experts who cheat … their customers should crowd out experts who do not, resulting in low trust, prestige, and wages. We ask how pro bono work …

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

In this paper we develop a theory of patenting in which a firm preserves its reputation to only apply for a patent … reputation to be preserved in equilibrium and analyze which market environments are favorable for such an equilibrium to exist …

emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging economies are more concerned about their reputation and tend to ride … that would help prevent potential crises. We provide evidence of the relevance of this reputation mechanism. …

preferences in combination with reputation opportunities keep principals from abusing their power, leading to the widespread …

equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models. …

This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations … of its individual members. I ask whether individuals ha ve more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on …