Showing 151 - 157 of 157
In this paper, we generalize the General Lotto game and the Colonel Blotto game to allow for battlefield valuations that are heterogeneous across battlefields and asymmetric across players, and for the players to have asymmetric resource constraints. We completely characterize Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011242157
We consider rules (strategies, commitments, contracts, or computer programs) that make behavior contingent on an opponent’s rule. The set of perfectly observable rules is not well defined. Previous contributions avoid this problem by restricting the rules deemed admissible. We instead limit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086457
Frustration, anger, and aggression have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, traffic safety, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011205372
This paper investigates how heterogeneity in contestants’ investment costs affects the competition intensity in a dynamic elimination contest. Theory predicts that the absolute level of investment costs has no effect on the competition intensity in homogeneous interactions. Relative cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701084
We study nonlinear income taxation in a Roy model in which agents’ productivity is sectorspecific. We show that when income taxes can be sector-specific, the Diamond-Mirrlees theorem (according to which the second-best displays production efficiency) fails: social welfare (be it Rawlsian or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960640
We investigate the formation of global climate agreements (= stable grand climate coalitions) in a model, in which climate policy takes the form of carbon emission taxation and fossil fuel and consumption goods are traded on world markets. We expand the model of Eichner and Pethig (2014) by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010960648
The basic model of the literature on self-enforcing international environmental agreements is a model of autarkic countries. We extend that model by international trade and investigate its impact on the performance of ’Nash’ coalitions and on their stability, in particular, in a general...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568607