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Strategic Choices for Redistribution and the Veil of Ignorance: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Gerber, Anke; Nicklisch, Andreas; Voigt, Stefan - CESifo - 2013
We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals’ information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877661
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Justice under Uncertainty
Cettolin, Elena; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2013
choices have uncertain outcomes. We report the results of a first experiment investigating just allocations of resources when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877816
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Organizations, Diffused Pivotality and Immoral Outcomes
Falk, Armin; Szech, Nora - CESifo - 2013
This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877864
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Us and Them: Distributional Preferences in Small and Large Groups
Schumacher, Heiner; Kesternich, Iris; Kosfeld, Michael; … - CESifo - 2014
We analyze distributional preferences in games in which a decider chooses the provision of a good that benefits a receiver and creates costs for a group of payers. The average decider takes into account the welfare of all parties and has concerns for efficiency. However, she attaches similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010747223
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Let the Market Decide: An Experimental Study of Competition and Fairness
Bartling, Björn; Grieder, Manuel; Zehnder, Christian - CESifo - 2014
Is competition perceived as a fair procedure? We report data from laboratory experiments where a powerful buyer can trade with one of several sellers. Sellers who feel shortchanged can engage in counterproductive behavior to punish the buyer. We find that the same unfavorable terms of trade...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781540
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Does Willful Ignorance Deflect Punishment? - An Experimental Study
Bartling, Björn; Engl, Florian; Weber, Roberto A. - CESifo - 2013
consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games in which a dictator can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010674729
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The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks
Dan Kovenock J.; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - CESifo - 2010
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671693
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Bracelets of Pride and Guilt? An Experimental Test of Self-Signaling in Charitable Giving
Weele, Joël J. van der; Siemens, Ferdinand von - CESifo - 2014
experiment subjects divide 20 euros between themselves and a charity. Some randomly determined participants are induced to wear a … bracelet for the two weeks following their donation decision. This bracelet serves as a private reminder of the experiment … remember the experiment in the following two weeks. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010747212
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An Explanation of (First Round) Contributions in Public-Good Experiments
Weimann, Joachim; Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo; … - CESifo - 2014
participated in our experiment in groups of up to 100 subjects. The results confirm that first-round contributions increase with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948901
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On the Persistence of Strategic Sophistication
Georganas, Sotiris; Healy, Paul J.; Weber, Roberto A. - CESifo - 2014
We examine whether the ‘Level-k’ model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects’ estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877731