Showing 1 - 10 of 59
unique equilibrium where legal enforcement remains weak and individual values discourage cooperation. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249467
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765909
Economists draw important lessons for modern development from the medieval Maghribi traders who, according to Greif, enforced contracts multilaterally through a closed, private-order ‘coalition’. We show that this view is untenable. The Maghribis used formal legal mechanisms and entered...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766208
We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation and growth. We compare a rigid (law set ex-ante) legal system and a flexible one (law set after observing current technology). The flexible system dominates in terms of welfare, amount of innovation and output growth at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009150639
The medieval Champagne fairs are widely used to draw lessons about the institutional basis for long-distance impersonal exchange. This paper re-examines the causes of the outstanding success of the Champagne fairs in mediating international trade, the timing and causes of the fairs’ decline,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009020795
Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel from 1984-2009, we follow persons from their working life into their retirement years and find that, on average, employed people maintain their life satisfaction upon retirement, while long-term unemployed people report a substantial increase in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009224868
Trust games are employed to investigate the effect of heterogeneity in income and race on cooperation in South Africa …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766054
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979399
In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094348
venture, the firms do not necessary choose the highest degree of cooperation available. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094393