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Creative Destruction and Productive Preemption

Norbäck, Pehr-Johan; Persson, Lars; Svensson, Roger - CESifo - 2013

We develop a theory of innovation for entry and sale into oligopoly, and show that inventions of higher quality are more likely to be sold (or licensed) to an incumbent due to strategic product market effects on the sales price. Such preemptive acquisitions by incumbents are shown to stimulate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877893

Information Transmission and Ownership Consolidation in Aid Programs

Dreher, Axel; Marchesi, Silvia - CESifo - 2013

This paper explores the role of information transmission in explaining donors’ choice between project aid and budget support. Budget support increases the involvement of recipient governments in the decision-making process and can thus be an example of a “delegation-scheme.” Conversely,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701088

What is the Relation (if any) Between a Firm's Corporate Governance Arrangements and its Financial Performance?

Wessels, Roberto E.; Wansbeek, Tom J.; Dam, Lammertjan - CESifo - 2014

We present a model to test the null hypothesis that firms organize their corporate governancearrangements optimally given the constraints they face. Following the literature, the modelrejects the null if the conditional correlation between governance and performance issignificantly different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249564

What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009

Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - CESifo - 2012

work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in … for performance and that the great recession of 2009 acted as a disciplining devise on CEO pay in Germany. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653374

Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2010

We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to … choice. Optimality would require a large ownership stake for monitoring but a small stake for not interfering with managerial …. The large shareholder retains full ownership of the firm but monitoring, and the resulting firing policy, are distorted …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596583

Corporate Deductibility Provisions and Managerial Incentives

Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - CESifo - 2013

Using an agency model of firm behavior, the paper analyzes whether the cost of investment should be tax exempt. The findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is tax deductible, as commonly advocated. The extent to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732350

A Theory of Tax Avoidance - Managerial Incentives for Tax Planning in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - CESifo - 2014

We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010786744