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Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
Heinemann, Frank; Nagel, Rosemarie; Ockenfels, Peter - CESifo - 2004
This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects’ certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094385
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Adoption and Diffusion of Health Information Technology - The Case of Primary Care Clinics
Callaway, Brant; Ghosal, Vivek - CESifo - 2012
We empirically examine the determinants of adoption of information technology by primary healthcare clinics using a … large and complex market. Our study generates several interesting results related to the adoption and diffusion of Health … Information Technology (HIT), including: (1) the adoption probabilities vary considerably by the specific type of clinic; (2) in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010570052
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Measuring Agents' Reaction to Private and Public Information in Games with Strategic Complementarities
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - CESifo - 2010
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572521
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A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model
Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2011
This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144882
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The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
Tillio, Alfredo Di; Kos, Nenad; Messner, Matthias - CESifo - 2014
This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010889983
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations
Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435
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Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation
Schütte, Miriam; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph - CESifo - 2013
This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010639425
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Information, Coordination, and the Industrialization of Countries
Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus - CESifo - 2006
The industrialization process of a country is often plagued by a failure to coordinate investment decisions. Using the Global Games approach we can solve this coordination problem and eliminate the problem of multiple equilibria. We show how appropriate information provision enhances efficiency....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094193
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Long Persuasion Games
Forges, Francoise; Koessler, Frédéric - CESifo - 2006
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181479
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Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition
Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - CESifo - 2014
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779412