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On the Perils of Stabilizing Prices when Agents are Learning

Mele, Antonio; Molnár, Krisztina; Santoro, Sergio - CESifo - 2015

losses are outweighed by short term gains from the learning phase. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011155373

Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules

Lipatov, Vilen - CESifo - 2014

We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764298

Policy Experimentation, Political Competition, and Heterogeneous Beliefs

Millner, Antony; Ollivier, Hélène; Simon, Leo - CESifo - 2014

endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781549

Reason, Intuition, and Time

Sahm, Marco; Weizsäcker, Robert K. von - CESifo - 2014

prevalent in early and late stages of a learning process, whereas reason governs decisions in intermediate stages. Examples …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011103391

Optimal Monetary Policy when Agents are Learning

Molnár, Krisztina; Santoro, Sergio - CESifo - 2010

We derive the optimal monetary policy in a sticky price model when private agents follow adaptive learning. We show … order to facilitate private sector learning and thus ease the future intratemporal inflation-output gap trade-offs. The … policy recommendation is robust: the welfare loss entailed by the optimal policy under learning if the private sector …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596587

Strategic Experimentation: The Case of Poisson Bandits

Cripps, Martin W.; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - CESifo - 2002

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051553

Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination

Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - CESifo - 2004

In currency exchange markets, there is a conflict between individual decisions and the socially optimal solution. Whereas agents have a coordination motive to take the same position, at the social level effective market coordination per se is not socially valuable, and the central bank aims at...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765918

Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time

Cheung, Yin-Wong; Friedman, Daniel - CESifo - 2008

We examine speculative attacks in a controlled laboratory environment featuring continuous time, size asymmetries, and varying amounts of public information. Attacks succeeded in 233 of 344 possible cases. When speculators have symmetric size and access to information: (a) weaker fundamentals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766165

Separating the Hawks from the Doves: Evidence from Continuous Time Laboratory Games

Oprea, Ryan; Henwood, Keith; Friedman, Daniel - CESifo - 2010

Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511594

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process

Ania, Ana B.; Wagener, Andreas - CESifo - 2009

social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000398