This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal non-linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that … the joint determination of the non-linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be … implemented. Monitoring of labor effort reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates …

When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal …, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because non …

gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project … choice. Optimality would require a large ownership stake for monitoring but a small stake for not interfering with managerial …. The large shareholder retains full ownership of the firm but monitoring, and the resulting firing policy, are distorted …

. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in …

An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither … the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient … condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. Typically, several monitoring intensities give rise to the same …

charge of project selection and the supervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We consider the case in which the large …

monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager’s compensation to firm performance, and (iii … revealed by monitoring. …

sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …

the shapes of contracts and the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when … principals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others’ monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free riding in … monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flat payments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear …