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Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy - The Core Revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2010

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice”) which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596567

Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values

Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010

with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative …) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724

Households, Markets and Public Choice

Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans - CESifo - 2014

We develop a model that combines competitive exchange of private commodities across endogenously formed groups with public good provision and global collective decisions. There is a tension between local and global collective decisions. In particular, we show that group formation and collective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010889986

The Cost of Migrating to a Culturally Different Location

Falck, Oliver; Lameli, Alfred; Ruhose, Jens - CESifo - 2014

Ever since Sjaastad (1962), researchers have struggled to quantify the psychic cost of migration. We monetize psychic cost as the wage premium for moving to a culturally different location. We combine administrative social security panel data with a proxy for cultural difference based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948845

Reaching Market Equilibrium Merely by Bilateral Barters

Flåm, Sjur Didrik - CESifo - 2013

Motivated by emission and resource markets, this paper considers repeated, bilateral barters between owners of commodity bundles, contingent claims, or property rights. Focus is on feasible, voluntary exchanges, driven only by differences in substitution rates. No coordination is ever needed....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010721608

Household Formation and Markets

Gersbach, Hans; Haller, Hans; Konishi, Hideo - CESifo - 2013

We consider competitive markets for multiple commodities with endogenous formation of one- or two-person households. Within each two-person household, externalities from the partner’s commodity consumption and unpriced actions are allowed. Each individual has two types of traits: observable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010698700

Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts

Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - CESifo - 2014

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker’s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877973

Spillover Effects of Minimum Wages: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Dittrich, Marcus; Knabe, Andreas; Leipold, Kristina - CESifo - 2011

We study the spillover effects of minimum wages in a laboratory experiment. In a bilateral firm-worker bargaining setting, we find that the introduction of a minimum wage exerts upward pressure on wages even if the minimum wage is too low to be a binding restriction. Furthermore, raising the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294100

Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application

Gould, Matthew; Rablen, Matthew - CESifo - 2013

We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723541

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations

Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435