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We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877748
We use a unique hand collected data set of 6 258 auctions from the online football manager game Hattrick to study micro …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766032
We conducted a controlled field experiment on eBay and examined to what extent both social and competitive laboratory behavior is robust to institutionally complex real world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. EBay’s natural trading system provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181559
This paper analyzes a two-stage sealed-bid auction that is frequently employed in privatization, takeover, and merger and acquisition contests. This auction format yields the same expected revenue as the open ascending (English) auction, yet is less susceptible to preemptive bidding and collusion.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405744
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735190
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010599726
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877664
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877882
I extend multi-unit auction estimation techniques to a setting in which firms can express cost complementarities over time. In the context of electricity markets, I show how the auction structure and bidding data can be used to estimate these complementarities, which in these markets arise due...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877888