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Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective: Part 1
Ogilvie, Sheilagh; Carus, A. W. - CESifo - 2014
This is Part 1 of a two-part paper which surveys the historical evidence on the role of institutions in economic growth … that private-order institutions have not historically substituted for public-order ones in enabling markets to function …, clarify the growth effects of other institutions, including contract-enforcement mechanisms, guilds, communities, serfdom, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877698
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Institutions and Economic Growth in Historical Perspective: Part 2
Ogilvie, Sheilagh; Carus, A. W. - CESifo - 2014
This is Part 2 of a two-part paper which surveys the historical evidence on the role of institutions in economic growth … that private-order institutions have not historically substituted for public-order ones in enabling markets to function …, clarify the growth effects of other institutions, including contract-enforcement mechanisms, guilds, communities, serfdom, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877727
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Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation: Evidence from Germany
Edwards, Jeremy; Weichenrieder, Alfons - CESifo - 1999
Concentrated ownership of large listed companies is widespread throughout the world, and Germany is typical in this respect. This paper proposes a method of distinguishing empirically between the beneficial and harmful effects of ownership concentration, and applies it to German data. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406388
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What is the Relation (if any) Between a Firm's Corporate Governance Arrangements and its Financial Performance?
Wessels, Roberto E.; Wansbeek, Tom J.; Dam, Lammertjan - CESifo - 2014
We present a model to test the null hypothesis that firms organize their corporate governancearrangements optimally given the constraints they face. Following the literature, the modelrejects the null if the conditional correlation between governance and performance issignificantly different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249564
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What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009
Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - CESifo - 2012
The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone’s hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653374
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Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2010
We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596583
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Corporate Deductibility Provisions and Managerial Incentives
Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - CESifo - 2013
Using an agency model of firm behavior, the paper analyzes whether the cost of investment should be tax exempt. The findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is tax deductible, as commonly advocated. The extent to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732350
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A Revealed Preference Approach to Understanding Corporate Governance Problems: Evidence from Canada
Chirinko, Robert S.; Schaller, Huntley - CESifo - 2002
By studying the gap between the discount rates used by executives and shareholders, we assess the extent to which governance problems distort firm behavior. The estimation strategy recovers discount rates used by executives from the pattern of their actual investment spending. Our empirical work...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765749
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Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and Optimal Board Structure
Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2005
The paper analyzes the optimal structure of the board of directors in a firm with a large shareholder sitting on the board. In a one-tier structure the sole board performs all tasks, while in a two-tier structure the management board is in charge of project selection and the supervisory board is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765820
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The Positive Economics of Labor Market Rigidities and Investor Protection
Fehn, Rainer; Meier, Carsten-Patrick - CESifo - 2001
This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a substantial protection of insiders on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766256