Similar Search Results

Taking the Lord's Name in Vain: The Impact of Connected Directors on 19th Century British Banks

Grossman, Richard S.; Imai, Masami - CESifo - 2014

corroborates this finding, showing that a bank’s shares exhibited negative abnormal returns when their directors were elected to … Parliament) and aristocratic titles (e.g., lords)--on the boards of directors of English and Welsh banks from 1879-1909 to … investigate whether the appointment of well-connected directors enhanced equity value for bank shareholders. Our analysis of panel …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011099763

Ownership Concentration and Share Valuation: Evidence from Germany

Edwards, Jeremy; Weichenrieder, Alfons - CESifo - 1999

Concentrated ownership of large listed companies is widespread throughout the world, and Germany is typical in this respect. This paper proposes a method of distinguishing empirically between the beneficial and harmful effects of ownership concentration, and applies it to German data. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406388

What is the Relation (if any) Between a Firm's Corporate Governance Arrangements and its Financial Performance?

Wessels, Roberto E.; Wansbeek, Tom J.; Dam, Lammertjan - CESifo - 2014

We present a model to test the null hypothesis that firms organize their corporate governancearrangements optimally given the constraints they face. Following the literature, the modelrejects the null if the conditional correlation between governance and performance issignificantly different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249564

What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009

Fabbri, Francesca; Marin, Dalia - CESifo - 2012

The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone’s hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009653374

Optimal Delegation when the Large Shareholder has Multiple Tasks

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2010

We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596583

Corporate Deductibility Provisions and Managerial Incentives

Köthenbürger, Marko; Stimmelmayr, Michael - CESifo - 2013

internal provision of incentive pay and external monitoring by banks interact in constraining the manager and whether retained …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010732350

A Theory of Tax Avoidance - Managerial Incentives for Tax Planning in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model

Ewert, Ralf; Niemann, Rainer - CESifo - 2014

We derive determinants of tax avoidance by means of a multi-task principal-agent model. We extend prevailing models by integrating both corporate and individual income taxation as well as by including tax planning effort in the agent’s action portfolio. Our model shows novel and apparently...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010786744

The Effect of Corporate Taxation and Ownership on Raising Shareholder Capital

Krämer, Robert; Lipatov, Vilen - CESifo - 2013

We analyze how interactions between corporate taxation and corporate governance affect shareholder capital. Using a model with strategic interaction between managers and outside shareholders, we hypothesize that, while an increase in the corporate tax rate decreases shareholder capital, an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701082

A Revealed Preference Approach to Understanding Corporate Governance Problems: Evidence from Canada

Chirinko, Robert S.; Schaller, Huntley - CESifo - 2002

By studying the gap between the discount rates used by executives and shareholders, we assess the extent to which governance problems distort firm behavior. The estimation strategy recovers discount rates used by executives from the pattern of their actual investment spending. Our empirical work...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765749

Ownership Concentration, Monitoring and Optimal Board Structure

Graziano, Clara; Luporini, Annalisa - CESifo - 2005

The paper analyzes the optimal structure of the board of directors in a firm with a large shareholder sitting on the board. In a one-tier structure the sole board performs all tasks, while in a two-tier structure the management board is in charge of project selection and the supervisory board is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765820