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Universal Basic Income versus Unemployment Insurance
Fabre, Alice; Pallage, Stéphane; Zimmermann, Christian - CESifo - 2014
In this paper we compare the welfare effects of unemployment insurance (UI) with an universal basic income (UBI) system … shocks. While the unemployment insurance program should do a better job at protecting the unemployed, it suffers from moral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096356
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Cash-on-Hand and the Duration of Job Search: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Norway
Basten, Christoph; Fagereng, Andreas; Telle, Kjetil - CESifo - 2012
We identify the causal effect of lump-sum severance payments on non-employment duration in Norway by exploiting a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010561497
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How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment
Lalive, Rafael; Ours, Jan C. van; Zweimüller, Josef - CESifo - 2004
) and the potential duration of benefits (PBD) – affect the duration of unemployment. In 1989, the Austrian government made … unemployment insurance more generous by changing, simultaneously, the maximum duration of regular unemployment benefits and the … the maximum duration of benefits. We use these results to split up the total costs to unemployment insurance funds into …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406301
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Welfare Time Limits in the United States – Experiences with a New Welfare-to-Work Approach
Ochel, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2004
This paper reviews the evidence on welfare time limits in the United States. It primarily refers to experimental and econometric evaluations. Time limits affect welfare recipients both before and after their limits are reached. Time limits reduce welfare receipt and increase employment before...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406156
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Regional Implications of Financial Market Development: Credit Rationing, Trade, and Location
Ehrlich, Maximilian Von; Seidel, Tobias - CESifo - 2013
We develop a heterogeneous-firms model with trade in goods, labor mobility and credit constraints due to moral hazard. Mitigating financial frictions reduces the incentive of high-skilled workers to migrate to one region such that an unequal distribution of industrial activity becomes less...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877832
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Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard
Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, Christian; Stahl, Konrad O. - CESifo - 2013
We study the effects of improvements in market transparency on eBay on seller exit and continuing sellers’ behavior. An improvement in market transparency by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings led to a significant increase in buyer valuation especially of sellers rated poorly prior to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877941
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Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts
Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - CESifo - 2014
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker’s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877973
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The European Central Bank: Lender of Last Resort in the Government Bond Markets?
Grauwe, Paul De - CESifo - 2011
The sovereign debt crisis has made it clear that central banking is more than keeping inflation low. Central banks are also responsible for financial stability. An essential tool in maintaining financial stability is provided by the capacity of the central bank to be the lender of last resort in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294102
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Firms' Moral Hazard in Sickness Absences
Böheim, René; Leoni, Thomas - CESifo - 2011
Sick workers in many countries receive sick pay during their illness-related absences from the workplace. In several countries, the social security system insures firms against their workers’ sickness absences. However, this insurance may create moral hazard problems for firms, leading to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009320787
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How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country: An Optimal Taxation Problem with Moral Hazard
Cigno, Alessandro - CESifo - 2010
Given that credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given also that intra-household transfers, and much of the work a child does, are private information, the second-best policy uses a combination of need and merit based education awards, together with a mix of taxes on parental income,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596586