Similar Search Results

The Weak Rationality Principle in Economics

Kirchgässner, Gebhard - CESifo - 2005

The weak rationality principle is not an empirical statement but a heuristic rule of how to proceed in social sciences …-foundation and, therefore, employ the rationality assumption in economic models. Then, with reference to the ‘bounded rationality … a part of the rationality assumption. We conclude with some remarks on handling the problems of ‘free will’ as well as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406455

Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer

Armstrong, Mark; Huck, Steffen - CESifo - 2010

We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008572583

A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry

Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J. - CESifo - 2013

In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes. They exist to make profits by selling intermediaries...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877950

Dynamic Commercial Lobbying

Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J. - CESifo - 2013

This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610089

Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies

Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero - CESifo - 2008

In this paper we build a formal model to study market environments where information is costly to acquire and is of use also to potential competitors. In such situations a market for information may form, where reports - of unverifiable quality - over the information acquired are sold. A...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765704

Competitive Rational Expectations Equilibria without Apology

Kovalenkov, Alexander; Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2008

In a standard financial market model with asymmetric information with a finite number N of risk-averse informed traders, competitive rational expectations equilibria provide a good approximation to strategic equilibria as long as N is not too small: equilibrium prices in eachsituation converge...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405996

A Large-Market Rational Expectations Equilibrium Model

Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2011

This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144882

Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance

Morath, Florian - CESifo - 2011

Private provision of public goods often takes place as a war of attrition: individuals wait until someone else volunteers and provides the good. After a certain time period, however, one individual may be randomly selected. If the individuals are uncertain about their cost of provision, but can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021240

Who Should Pay for Certification?

Stahl, Konrad O.; Strausz, Roland - CESifo - 2011

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853867

The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information

Dang, Tri Vi; Morath, Florian - CESifo - 2015

This paper analyzes the effects of taxation on information acquisition and bilateral trade in decentralized markets. We show that a profit tax and a transaction tax have opposite implications for equilibrium outcome in bargaining. A marginal increase of a transaction tax increases the incentive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011120474