We introduce the E-correspondence principle for stochastic dynamic expectations models as a tool for comparative dynamics analysis. The principle is applicable to equilibria that are stable under least squares and closely related learning rules. With this technique it is possible to study,...

We develop a monetary model with flexible supply of labor, cash in advance constraints and government spending financed by seignorage. This model has two regimes. One regime is conventional with two steady states. The other regime has a unique steady state which can be determinate or...

We examine the nonlinear model Xt = Et F(xt+1) . Markov SSEs exist near an indeterminate steady state, X = F(X), provided F´(X)> 1. We show that there exist Markov SSEs that are E-stable, and therefore locally stable under adaptive learning, if F´(X)< -1.

We consider the stability under adaptive learning of the complete set of solutions to the model when . In addition to the fundamentals solution, the literature describes both finite-state Markov sunspot solutions, satisfying a resonant frequency condition, and autoregressive solutions depending...

An economy exhibits structural heterogeneity when the forecasts of different agents have different effects on the determination of aggregate variables. Various forms of structural heterogeneity can arise and we study the important case of economies in which agents' behavior depends on forecasts...

A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the...

This paper shows that price rigidity evolves in an economy populated by imperfectly rational agents who experiment with alternative rules of thumb. In the model, firms must set their prices in face of aggregate demand shocks. Their payoff depends on the level of aggregate demand, as well as on...

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...

This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. Equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible allocations...