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Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design

Brandts, Jordi; Charness, Gary; Ellman, Matthew - CESifo - 2012

shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent … and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts … considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010558687

Information, Uncertainty, and Subjective Entitlements in Bargaining

Karagözoglu, Emin; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2010

coarse performance information lead to bargaining asymmetries. In addition, we find that bargainers’ subjective entitlements … bargaining process from opening offers to (dis)agreements and find that uncertainties in surplus production and (even) a very … bargaining process and significantly contribute to the differences in bargaining outcomes. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511615

Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry

Karle, Heiko; Klein, Tobias J.; Stahl, Konrad O. - CESifo - 2011

We study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008872225

Turning the Page on Business Formats for Digital Platforms: Does Apple's Agency Model Soften Competition?

Foros, Oystein; Kind, Hans Jarle; Shaffer, Greg - CESifo - 2013

) upstream firms earn positive surplus even when platform providers have all the bargaining power; and (iii) with asymmetric …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010690385

Industry Structure and Pricing over the Business Cycle

Spiegel, Yossi; Stahl, Konrad O. - CESifo - 2014

We consider the interaction between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant, and examine how this interaction is affected by demand fluctuations. Our model gives rise to procyclical entry, prices, and price-cost margins, although the average price in the market can be countercyclical if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877829

Manufacturers Mergers and Product Variety in Vertically Related Markets

Milliou, Chrysovalantou; Sandonis, Joel - CESifo - 2014

We study final product manufacturers’ incentives to introduce new products into the market and how they are affected by a merger among them. We show that when manufacturers distribute their products through multi-product retailers, a manufacturers merger, although it leads to an increase in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010886105

Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko - CESifo - 2009

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000368

Upstream Horizontal Mergers and Efficiency Gains

Milliou, Chrysovalantou; Pavlou, Apostolis - CESifo - 2009

We study upstream horizontal mergers and their potential efficiency gains. We show that an upstream horizontal merger can give rise to two efficiency-enhancing effects when firms trade through two-part tariffs. It increases R&D investments and decreases wholesale prices when downstream...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005010147

Merger Policy to Promote ‘Global Players’? A Simple Model

Haufler, Andreas; Nielsen, Søren Bo - CESifo - 2005

We use a simple framework where firms in two countries serve their respective domestic markets and a world market to analyze under which conditions cost-reducing mergers will be beneficial for the merging firms, the home country, and the world as a whole. For a national merger, the policies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766066

Global Cartels, Leniency Programs and International Antitrust Cooperation

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko - CESifo - 2010

uncoordinated, multi-market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self-reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583667