Similar Search Results

Policy Experimentation, Political Competition, and Heterogeneous Beliefs

Millner, Antony; Ollivier, Hélène; Simon, Leo - CESifo - 2014

We consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally, but faces competition from a political opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters payoffs, but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781549

Mobility and Conflict

Bhattacharya, Sourav; Deb, Joyee; Kundu, Tapas - CESifo - 2012

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416114

The Female Vote and the Rise of AKP in Turkey

Fidrmuc, Jan; Tunali, Cigdem Börke - CESifo - 2015

Differences between the voting behavior of men and women have become one of the most significant issues in social science research in recent years. In this study, we examine whether there is gender gap in voting behavior in Turkey. Using European Social Survey data, we find that education level...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011194239

Soft Paternalism, Merit Goods, and Normative Individualism

Kirchgässner, Gebhard - CESifo - 2014

Paternalism is an attempt to influence individuals’ decisions for their own benefit, even if there are no third parties involved. This seems to contradict normative individualism, which provides the general orientation to our modern democracies. Soft or libertarian paternalism accepts the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752158

Reelection Threshold Contracts in Politics

Gersbach, Hans; Liessem, Verena - CESifo - 2001

When politicians are provided with insufficient incentives by the democratic election mechanism, we show that social welfare can be improved by threshold contracts. A threshold incentive contract stipulates a performance level which a politican must reach in order to have the right to stand for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005196248

The Golden Hello and Political Transitions

Aidt, Toke S.; Albornoz, Facundo; Gassebner, Martin - CESifo - 2012

have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to …We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version … probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010583639

Information Markets, Elections and Contracts

Gersbach, Hans; Müller, Markus - CESifo - 2011

Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833887

Globalization, Economic Freedom and Human Rights

Dreher, Axel; Gassebner, Martin; Siemers, Lars-H. R. - CESifo - 2010

Using the KOF Index of Globalization and two indices of economic freedom, we empirically analyze whether globalization and economic liberalization affect governments’ respect for human rights using a panel of 106 countries over the 1981-2004 period. According to our results, physical integrity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727302

Immunity

Reddy, Karthik; Schularick, Moritz; Skreta, Vasiliki - CESifo - 2013

world. Why, and with what effects, do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877744

Evidence on the Political Principal-Agent Problem from Voting on Public Finance for Concert Halls

Potrafke, Niklas - CESifo - 2013

Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principal-agent problem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principal-agent problems...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877857

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last