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Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2009

Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013056

Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2007

In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094348

Understanding the Emergence of Public Debt

Fochmann, Martin; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Weimann, Joachim - CESifo - 2014

We use a controlled laboratory experiment with and without overlapping generations to study the emergence of public debt. Public debt is chosen by popular vote, pays for public goods, and is repaid with general taxes. With a single generation, public debt is accumulated prudently, never leading...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877837

Tipping versus Cooperating to Supply a Public Good

Barrett, Scott; Dannenberg, Astrid - CESifo - 2015

, the classic cooperation game. In the prisoners’ dilemma, the first best outcome is attainable, but cannot be sustained as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011210784

Voting on Punishment Systems within a Heterogeneous Group

Noussair, Charles; Tan, Fangfang - CESifo - 2009

We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013941

Minimum Participation Rules for the Provision of Public Goods

Gerber, Anke; Neitzel, Jakob; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph - CESifo - 2012

This paper considers the endogenous formation of an institution to provide a public good. If the institution governs only its members, players have an incentive to free ride on the institution formation of others and the social dilemma is simply shifted to a higher level. Addressing this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645648

Culture and Cooperation

Gaechter, Simon; Herrmann, Benedikt; Thöni, Christian - CESifo - 2010

-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by … cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a … substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008534012

Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

Gaechter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Renner, Elke; … - CESifo - 2009

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000384

The Value of Non-Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments: Some Theory and Experimental Evidence

Berlemann, Michael; Dittrich, Marcus; Markwardt, Gunther - CESifo - 2004

In this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of the possibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goods settings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a public good might be motivated by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094302

Security of Property as a Public Good: Institutions, Socio-Political Environment and Experimental Behavior in Five Countries

Campos-Ortiz, Francisco; Putterman, Louis; Ahn, T.K.; … - CESifo - 2012

We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries— Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010595381

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