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Benefit-Cost Analysis of Environmental Projects: A Plethora of Systematic Biases
Graves, Philip E. - CESifo - 2010
There are many reasons to suspect that benefit-cost analysis applied to environmental policies will result in policy decisions that will reject those environmental policies. The important question, of course, is whether those rejections are based on proper science. The present paper explores...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511597
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Partial Coercion, Conditional Cooperation, and Self-Commitment in Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods
Cettolin, Elena; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2011
In this paper we experimentally investigate whether partial coercion can in combination with conditional cooperation increase contributions to a public good. We are especially interested in the behavior of the non-coerced populations. The main finding is that in our setting conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278128
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Security of Property as a Public Good: Institutions, Socio-Political Environment and Experimental Behavior in Five Countries
Campos-Ortiz, Francisco; Putterman, Louis; Ahn, T.K.; … - CESifo - 2012
We study experimentally the protection of property in five widely distinct countries— Austria, Mexico, Mongolia, South Korea and the United States. Our main results are that the security of property varies with experimental institutions, and that our subject pools exhibit significantly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010595381
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Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments
Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - CESifo - 2008
individuals’ cooperation preferences in one experiment and use them – as well as subjects’ elicited beliefs – to explain …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765860
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Asymmetric Obligations
Riedel, Nadine; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah - CESifo - 2011
We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding … and asymmetric minimum contribution levels (obligations) in a repeated public goods experiment. The results provide …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009020088
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Sequential versus Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence
Gaechter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Renner, Elke; … - CESifo - 2009
We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000384
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Public Good Provision with Robust Decision Making
Angelopoulos, Konstantinos; Economides, George; … - CESifo - 2012
In this paper, we study a two-country dynamic setup with environmental externalities and potential model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877702
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Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability
Aidt, Toke; Dutta, Jayasri - CESifo - 2010
. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be … efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of … accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583690
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Group Contests with Complementarities in Efforts
Kolmar, Martin; Rommeswinkel, Hendrik - CESifo - 2010
Usually, groups increase their productivity by the specialization of their group members. In these cases, group output is no longer simply a sum of individual outputs. We analyze contests with group-specific public goods that allow for different degrees of complementarity between group...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511604
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Matching as a Cure for Underprovision of Voluntary Public Good Supply: Analysis and an Example
Buchholz, Wolfgang; Cornes, Richard; Rübbelke, Dirk - CESifo - 2011
Matching mechanisms are regarded as an important instrument to bring about Pareto optimal allocations in a public good economy and to cure the underprovision problem associated with private provision of public goods. The desired Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium, however, emerges only...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008872210