Using the concept of Inequity Aversion we derive in a Moral Hazard setting several results which differ from conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal contracts. Second, there is a strong tendency towards...

This paper considers the efficiency of a contestable natural monopoly if consumers are heterogeneous and the monopolist can differentiate prices imperfectly. With restricted entry, the standard result in this case is that the monopoly offers a menu of price-quantity combinations which leads to...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Is the reputation of a firm tradeable when the previous owner has to retire even though ownership change is observable? We consider a competitive market in which a share of owners must retire in each period. New owners, observing only recent profits, bid for the firms on sale. Customers are...

Management research has long focused on the theory of the firm, studying for-profit organizations that produce privately owned resources based on central authority and within well-defined boundaries. In recent times, a new kind of enterprise has emerged that we call Community Enterprises. They...

This paper offers a new explanation for the prevalent use of convertible securities in venture capital finance. Convertible securities can be used to endogenously allocate cash flow rights as a function of the realized quality of the project. This property can be used to mitigate the double...

This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and...

This paper discusses the role of public policy towards the venture capital industry. The model emphasizes four margins: supply of entrepreneurs due to career choice, entry of venture capital funds and search for investment opportunities, entrepreneurial effort and venture capital advice during...

In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the...

A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm’s success, but...