Similar Search Results

Hillman, Arye L.; Metsuyanim, Kfir; Potrafke, Niklas - CESifo - 2015

Group-based identity undermines democracy by impeding democratic change of government. A substantial literature has … therefore studied how to make democracy consistent with group identity. We contribute to this literature by introducing the role … or replacement of local government because of disfunctionality. Our general contribution is to show how democracy can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011212080

Extremism Drives Out Moderation

Klose, Bettina; Dan Kovenock J. - CESifo - 2012

This article investigates the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts that are modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a willingness-to-pay criterion that admits preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547898

Resource Rents, Democracy and Corruption: Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa

Arezki, Rabah; Gylfason, Thorvaldur - CESifo - 2011

We examine the effect of the interaction between resource rents and democracy on corruption for a panel of 29 Sub …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294093

Mobility and Conflict

Bhattacharya, Sourav; Deb, Joyee; Kundu, Tapas - CESifo - 2012

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416114

Equity and Effectiveness of Optimal Taxation in Contests under an All-Pay Auction

Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2012

The means of contest design may include differential taxation of the prize. This paper establishes that, given a revenue-maximizing contest designer who faces a balanced-budget constraint, the optimal taxation scheme corresponding to an all-pay auction is appealing in two senses. First, it...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645631

Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests

Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2012

This paper evaluates differential prize taxation and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010551012

Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict

Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian - CESifo - 2012

Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010603853

Intention-Based Fairness Preferences in Two-Player Contests

Hoffmann, Magnus; Kolmar, Martin - CESifo - 2013

We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero. As a consequence,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608711

Direct and Structural Discrimination in Contests

Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2013

This paper evaluates direct and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the contestants’ prize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723527

Distributional Preferences in Probabilistic and Share Contests

Hoffmann, Magnus; Kolmar, Martin - CESifo - 2013

We analyze Nash equilibria of share and probabilistic contests when players have distributional preferences. If players are sufficiently similar, distributional preferences create multiple equilibria. For the case of only mildly heterogeneous players, equilibrium effort can be lower as well as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010636590

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last