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The Signaling Role of Corporate Social Responsibility
Blumkin, Tomer; Margalioth, Yoram; Sharoni, Adi - CESifo - 2014
We examine the role of CSR as a mechanism for private provision of public goods. We argue that corporations are using CSR to signal high product quality and demonstrate that signaling gives rise to an excessive level of contributions that offsets the positive externality, which causes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948835
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Corporate Philanthropy and Productivity: Evidence from an Online Real Effort Experiment
Tonin, Mirco; Vlassopoulos, Michael - CESifo - 2014
Contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and non-profit sector as well as in firms that engage in Corporate Philanthropy or other Corporate Social Responsibility policies. This paper compares the effectiveness of social incentives - that take the form...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010764293
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The Economics of Politically Connected Firms
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - CESifo - 2007
Political connections between firms and autocratic regimes are not secret and often even publicly displayed in many developing economies. We argue that tying a firm’s available rent to a regime’s survival acts as a credible commitment forcing entrepreneurs to support the government and to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094287
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Determinants of Voluntary Bank Disclosure: Evidence from Japanese Shinkin Banks
Spiegel, Mark M.; Yamori, Nobuyoshi - CESifo - 2004
Disclosure is widely regarded as a necessary condition for market discipline in a modern financial sector. However, the … determinants of disclosure decisions are still unknown, particularly among banks. This paper investigates the determinants of … disclosure by Japanese Shinkin banks in 1996 and 1997. This period is unique because disclosure of non-performing loans was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406090
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Communicating Subjective Evaluations
Lang, Matthias - CESifo - 2014
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal’s evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781550
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Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation
Vives, Xavier - CESifo - 2011
disclosure or introducing a derivatives market may backfire, aggravating fragility (in particular when the asset side of a … financial intermediary is opaque); the regulator should set together disclosure and prudential policy. The model is applied to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144883
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Privatisation and Institutions: A Cross Country Analysis
Bortolotti, Bernardo; Siniscalco, Domenico; Fantini, … - CESifo - 2000
Privatisation, i.e. the transfer of ownership and control of state-owned enterprises, is a worldwide phenomenon. Which political, economic and institutional factors are shaping this process? This paper addresses the issue presenting new evidence from a sample of 49 countries. From an empirical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765761
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Elections, Fiscal Policy and Growth: Revisiting the Mechanism
Economides, George; Philippopoulos, Apostolis; Price, Simon - CESifo - 2002
This short paper reconsiders the popular result that the lower the probability of getting reelected, the stronger the incumbent politicians’ incentive to follow short-sighted, inefficient policies. The set-up is a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth and optimal fiscal policy, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765948
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Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes: What Are the Stylized Facts?
Persson, Torsten; Tabellini, Guido - CESifo - 2001
We investigate the effect of electoral rules and political regimes on fiscal policy outcomes in a panel of 61 democracies from 1960 and onwards. In presidential regimes, the size of government is smaller and less responsive to income shocks, compared to parliamentary regimes. Under majoritarian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405877