Similar Search Results

Equity as a Prerequisite for Stable Cooperation in a Public-Good Economy - The Core Revisited

Buchholz, Wolfgang; Peters, Wolfgang - CESifo - 2010

on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … sacrifice”) which is derived from the egalitarian-equivalent concept suggested by Moulin (1987). We also develop a simple core … test by which it can be checked whether a given allocation is in the core thus being a possible outcome of a cooperative …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596567

Core-stable Rings in Auctions with Independent Private Values

Biran, Omer; Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2010

) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724

Moral Hazard and Bargaining over Incentive Contracts

Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - CESifo - 2014

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker’s effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877973

Spillover Effects of Minimum Wages: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Dittrich, Marcus; Knabe, Andreas; Leipold, Kristina - CESifo - 2011

We study the spillover effects of minimum wages in a laboratory experiment. In a bilateral firm-worker bargaining setting, we find that the introduction of a minimum wage exerts upward pressure on wages even if the minimum wage is too low to be a binding restriction. Furthermore, raising the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294100

Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application

Gould, Matthew; Rablen, Matthew - CESifo - 2013

We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723541

Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations

Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - CESifo - 2014

Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752435

Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency

Gould, Matthew; Rablen, Matthew D. - CESifo - 2014

Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a-priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the “structural reforms” contained within eleven current reform proposals,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779411

Bargaining with a Residual Claimant: An Experimental Study

Embrey, Matthew; Hyndman, Kyle; Riedl, Arno - CESifo - 2014

We experimentally investigate a bargaining environment in which players negotiate over a fixed payment to one player, while the other player receives the residual from a random pie realization after subtracting the fixed payment. Contrary to the intuition that risk exposure is detrimental, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086455

Reaching Market Equilibrium Merely by Bilateral Barters

Flåm, Sjur Didrik - CESifo - 2013

Motivated by emission and resource markets, this paper considers repeated, bilateral barters between owners of commodity bundles, contingent claims, or property rights. Focus is on feasible, voluntary exchanges, driven only by differences in substitution rates. No coordination is ever needed....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010721608

The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in Exchange Economies with and without Indivisibilities

Forges, Francoise - CESifo - 2006

The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d’Aspremont and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765690