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The Eurozone Needs Exit Rules
Fahrholz, Christian; Wójcik, Cezary - CESifo - 2012
This paper argues that the key issue for defining and solving the Eurozone’s (EZ) difficulties lies in readjusting the relationship between the centre and the periphery of the EZ. Our argument proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the basic finance problem of a centre-periphery system is captured by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010553271
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The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?
Leininger, Wolfgang; Ockenfels, Axel - CESifo - 2008
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181276
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The Bail-Out! Positive Political Economics of Greek-type Crises in the EMU
Fahrholz, Christian; Wójcik, Cezary - CESifo - 2010
The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU’s present...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671732
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Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Myrseth, Kristian … - CESifo - 2013
We develop a model that relates self-control and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. As … of cooperation. This means that there is evidence for an impulse to be selfish and that cooperative behavior requires …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010639421
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Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design
Brandts, Jordi; Charness, Gary; Ellman, Matthew - CESifo - 2012
shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence of communication, we find that rigid contracts are more frequent … and lead to higher earnings for both buyer and seller. By contrast, in the presence of communication, flexible contracts … considerably more from flexible with communication than rigid without communication. Our results show quite strongly that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010558687
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Consuming your Way to Efficiency: Public Goods Provision through Non-Distortionary Tax Lotteries
Giebe, Thomas; Schweinzer, Paul - CESifo - 2013
We revisit the classical result that financing a pure public good through taxation of private consumption is inefficient. To this standard setup we add a consumption contest in which consumers can win a prize. We show that an appropriately chosen contest—which we call a ‘tax lottery’—can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877710
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Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link
Arce, Daniel G.; Dan Kovenock J.; Roberson, Brian - CESifo - 2009
In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013950
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A Theory of Government Procrastination
Furusawa, Taiji; Lai, Edwin L.-C. - CESifo - 2011
We present a theory to explain government procrastination as a consequence of its present-bias resulting from the political uncertainty in a two-party political system. We show that under a two-party political system the party in office tends to be present-biased. This may lead to inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399664
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Voting as a Signaling Device
Aytimur, R. Emre; Boukouras, Aristotelis; Schwager, Robert - CESifo - 2012
In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416121
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Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
Siemens, Ferdinand von - CESifo - 2011
Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278134