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The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control
Aytimur, R. Emre; Boukouras, Aristotelis; Schwager, Robert - CESifo - 2012
We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when the implemented policy arises from a compromise between the government and an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model differ significantly from the original: the distance between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010561495
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Immunity
Reddy, Karthik; Schularick, Moritz; Skreta, Vasiliki - CESifo - 2013
Legal provisions that protect politicians from arrest and prosecution exist throughout much of the modern democratic … world. Why, and with what effects, do societies choose to place their politicians above the law? We examine the institution …; while statutory immunity provisions protect honest politicians from politically-motivated charges, they may also incentivize …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877744
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Evidence on the Political Principal-Agent Problem from Voting on Public Finance for Concert Halls
Potrafke, Niklas - CESifo - 2013
Principal-agent problems can arise when preferences of voters are not aligned with preferences of political representatives. Often the consequence of the political principal-agent problem is political catering to special interests. In this paper I provide examples of principal-agent problems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877857
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Behavioral Political Economy: A Survey
Schnellenbach, Jan; Schubert, Christian - CESifo - 2014
Explaining individual behavior in politics should rely on the same motivational assumptions as explaining behavior in the market: That’s what Political Economy, understood as the application of economics to the study of political processes, is all about. In its standard variant, those who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010948848
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How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy
Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - CESifo - 2012
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010544187
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Mobility and Conflict
Bhattacharya, Sourav; Deb, Joyee; Kundu, Tapas - CESifo - 2012
We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416114
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Equity and Effectiveness of Optimal Taxation in Contests under an All-Pay Auction
Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2012
The means of contest design may include differential taxation of the prize. This paper establishes that, given a revenue-maximizing contest designer who faces a balanced-budget constraint, the optimal taxation scheme corresponding to an all-pay auction is appealing in two senses. First, it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645631
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Differential Prize Taxation and Structural Discrimination in Contests
Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2012
prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the contestants’ prize valuations as well as bias of the impact of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010551012
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Dynamic Commercial Lobbying
Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J. - CESifo - 2013
This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610089
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Direct and Structural Discrimination in Contests
Mealem, Yosef; Nitzan, Shmuel - CESifo - 2013
discrimination, namely, change of the contestants’ prize valuations as well as bias of the impact of their efforts. Optimal twofold …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723527