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Self-Enforcing Capital Tax Coordination
Eichner, Thomas; Pethig, Rüdiger - CESifo - 2013
countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706007
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Long Persuasion Games
Forges, Francoise; Koessler, Frédéric - CESifo - 2006
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181479
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The Herodotus Paradox
Baye, Michael R.; Dan Kovenock J.; Vries, Casper De - CESifo - 2010
The Babylonian bridal auction, described by Herodotus, is regarded as one of the earliest uses of an auction in history. Yet, to our knowledge, the literature lacks a formal equilibrium analysis of this auction. We provide such an analysis for the two-player case with complete and incomplete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511607
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Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments
Fischbacher, Urs; Gaechter, Simon - CESifo - 2008
We provide a test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation and its decline. We elicit individuals’ cooperation preferences in one experiment and use them – as well as subjects’ elicited beliefs – to explain contributions to a public good played repeatedly....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765860
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Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and Distributional Effects
Bosetti, Valentina; Carraro, Carlo; Massetti, Emanuele - CESifo - 2008
Most analyses of the Kyoto flexibility mechanisms focus on the cost effectiveness of “where” flexibility (e.g. by showing that mitigation costs are lower in a global permit market than in regional markets or in permit markets confined to Annex 1 countries). Less attention has been devoted to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765874
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Fiscal Competition over Taxes and Public Inputs: Theory and Evidence
Hauptmeier, Sebastian; Mittermaier, Ferdinand; Rincke, … - CESifo - 2008
We set up a model to characterize the reaction functions of governments competing for mobile capital by simultaneously setting both the business tax rate as well as the level of provision of a productive public input. Using a rich data set of local jurisdictions, we then test the predictions of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765934
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Reciprocity and Emotions: Arousal, Self-Reports, and Expectations
Ben-Shakhar, Gershon; Bornstein, Gary; Hopfensitz, Astrid; … - CESifo - 2004
-report measures were related to destruction decisions and expectations. The pattern of emotional arousal and its correlation with self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766252
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Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future
McBride, Michael; Skaperdas, Stergios - CESifo - 2009
In many instances of potential violent or non-violent conflict the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. In such environments we show that, as the future becomes more important, open conflict becomes more likely...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533978
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An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games
Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Dan Kovenock J.; Sheremeta, … - CESifo - 2009
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034634
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Effort Maximization in Asymmetric N-Person Contest Games
Franke, Jörg; Kanzow, Christian; Leininger, Wolfgang; … - CESifo - 2009
This paper provides existence and characterization of the optimal contest success function under the condition that the objective of the contest designer is total effort maximization among n heterogeneous players. Heterogeneity of players makes active participation of a player in equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005010155