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monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … manager’s trades. We show that at the optimal contract: (i) the manager’s portfolio is monitored only when the firm performs … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager’s compensation to firm performance, and (iii …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094243
conventional contract theory. Our three key insights are: First, inequity aversion plays a crucial role in the design of optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766116
We analyze the economic consequences of strategic delegation of the right to decide between public or private provision of governmental service and/or the authority to negotiate and renegotiate with the chosen service provider. Our model encompass both bureaucratic delegation from a government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405773
This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the … bargaining power, the contract in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields a more efficient outcome and induces more effort. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877973
We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766162
A manufacturer’s incentives to undertake non-contractible investments depend on the profit margin on her sales to the … retailer, and slotting allowances can facilitate such incentives by increasing unit wholesale prices. At first glance, it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094262
This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal non-linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that … the joint determination of the non-linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be … implemented. Monitoring of labor effort reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877903
When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal …, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249563
gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project … choice. Optimality would require a large ownership stake for monitoring but a small stake for not interfering with managerial … incentives. Delegating project choice to the manager can alleviate this conflict if managerial private benefits are not too small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596583
. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727277