Similar Search Results

Elections and Market Provision of Information

Bruns, Christian - CESifo - 2013

Economists usually think that rational voters have little incentives to acquire costly information. We present a theoretical model to show that, in contrast to this widely held belief, rational voters acquire considerable amounts of information if media technology is available because then they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877742

Voting as a Signaling Device

Aytimur, R. Emre; Boukouras, Aristotelis; Schwager, Robert - CESifo - 2012

In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009416121

The Power of Religious Organizations in Human Decision Processes: Analyzing Voting Behavior

Torgler, Benno; Stadelmann, David; Portmann, Marco - CESifo - 2013

In Switzerland, two key church institutions – the Conference of Swiss Bishops (CSB) and the Federation of Protestant Churches (FPC) – make public recommendations on how to vote for certain referenda. We leverage this unique situation to directly measure religious organizations’ power to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723526

Policy Experimentation, Political Competition, and Heterogeneous Beliefs

Millner, Antony; Ollivier, Hélène; Simon, Leo - CESifo - 2014

We consider a two period model in which an incumbent political party chooses the level of a current policy variable unilaterally, but faces competition from a political opponent in the future. Both parties care about voters payoffs, but they have different beliefs about how policy choices will...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010781549

Political Accountability and Real Authority of Government Bureaucracy

Dodlova, Marina - CESifo - 2013

In a country with weak institutional constraints on the executive, the real power might belong to the government bureaucracy rather than to an autocratic leader. We combine the Aghion-Tirole definition of formal and real authority with the Barro-Ferejohn model of political agency to study the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010703422

Go Divisive or Not? How Political Campaigns Affect Turnout

Gennaioli, Caterina - CESifo - 2010

This paper studies how political competition can lead candidates to strategically increase the salience of specific issues, in order to influence voting decisions of marginal groups, with non trivial consequences for turnout rates. In my setup issues differ in their divisiveness, to be defined...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833890

Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions Exploring a 160-Year Period

Stadelmann, David; Torgler, Benno - CESifo - 2012

Using a natural voting experiment in Switzerland that encompasses a 160-year period (1848–2009), we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on expert knowledge. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010568471

A Simple Model of the Commercial Lobbying Industry

Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J. - CESifo - 2013

In this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D ….C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes … level of commercial lobbying services is typically socially inefficient, and characterize the nature of the distortions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877950

Can Lobbying Encourage Abatement? Designing a New Policy Instrument

Lange, Ian A.; Polborn, Sarah - CESifo - 2012

Taking a political economy perspective this paper proposes an alternative carbon abatement policy instrument with significant advantages over existing policy instruments. The key feature of the proposed carbon securities is that they entitle their owners to a fixed proportion of ex ante unknown...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535631

How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - CESifo - 2012

This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010544187

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last