Showing 1 - 10 of 17
countries is self-enforcing. It is shown that there always exists a rather small stable tax coalition. For some subset of the … parameter space the grand coalition may be stable as well, even if the total number of countries is large. The small stable … coalition is not very effective in mitigating the inefficiency of the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The ineffectiveness is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706007
on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous … distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition of agents to separate and to block an initially given Pareto optimal … allocation which can be interpreted as the outcome of a negotiation process when all agents form a grand coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008596567
The ex ante incentive compatible core of an exchange economy with private information is the (standard) core of a … incentive compatible core can be empty, even if utility functions are quasi-linear. If, in addition to quasi-linearity, further … assumptions are made (like independent private values), the non-emptiness of the core follows nevertheless from d’Aspremont and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765690
scale such games are quite tractable in analysis, computation, and realization. A core imputation comes in terms of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405922
) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable …We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008583724
The real option theory provides a useful tool to evaluate an R&D investment under uncertainty because, unlike the NPV (Net Present Value), it considers the managerial flexibility that may be expand the investment opportunity value. However, most R&D investment projects are open to competing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005013067
The paper undertakes a cross-sectoral analysis of a salient empirical implication of the model of tacit collusion advanced by Abreu et al (1986). Specifically, the prevalence of a first order Markovian process for alternating between price wars and collusive periods is assessed by means of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352229
This paper argues that the key issue for defining and solving the Eurozone’s (EZ) difficulties lies in readjusting the relationship between the centre and the periphery of the EZ. Our argument proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the basic finance problem of a centre-periphery system is captured by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010553271
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also by the intention underlying this action. The theory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765909
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511594