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providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers have a propensity for envy, either scheme may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696252
I consider the efficiency of liability rules when courts obtain imperfect information about precautionary behavior. I ask what tort rules are consistent with socially efficient precautions, what informational requirements the evidence about the parties' behavior must satisfy, what decision rules...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067689
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This paper explores implications of nominal rigidity characterized by a non-constanthazard function for aggregate dynamics. I derive the NKPC under an arbitrary hazardfunction and parameterize it with the Weibull duration model. The resulting Phillips curveinvolves lagged inflation and lagged...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008939774
We use a static framework characterized by both moral hazard and holdup problems. In the model the optimal allocation of bargaining power balances these frictions. We examine the impact of improved monitoring on that optimal allocation and its impact upon effort, investment, profits and rents....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005858082
We examine the coexistence of banks and financial markets, studyinga credit market where the qualities of investment projects are notobservable and the investment decisions of entrepreneurs are not contractible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005854968
We analyze the efficiency properties of the negligence rule with liability insurance, when the tort-feasor's behavior is imperfectly observable both by the insurer and the court. Efficiency is shown to depend on the extent to which the evidence is informative, on the evidentiary standard for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005015315
We provide sufficient conditions for the first-order approach in the principal-agent problem when the agent’s utility has the non-separable form u(y - c(a)) where y is the contractual payoff and c(a) is the money cost of effort. We first consider a decision-maker facing prospects which cost...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010540951
Securitization is one of the most important innovations in financial markets. It is a process of converting illiquid loans that cannot be sold readily to third-party investors into liquid securities and selling them to dispersed investors. As a result, securitization improves liquidity in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010541212