The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...

The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms or order p4 for...

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoofs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by...

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in a situation where coalitions impose externalities on other players. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay provided that any set of coalitions profit from merging.

Neighbour games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component...

In this paper, we examine the impact of information on individual contributions in a public-bad experiment. We compare two experimental treatments. In the partial information treatment, subjects are only informed about the total contributions by their group, whereas in the full information...