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Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities.
Montero, M. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in a situation where coalitions impose externalities on other players. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay provided that any set of coalitions profit from merging.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618577
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Spatial Social Networks.
Johnson, C.; Gilles, R.P. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
We introduce a spatial cost topology in the network formation model analyzed by Jackson and Wolinsky, Journal of … describes variable costs of establishing social network connections. Participants form links based on a cost-benefit analysis … identify the conditions under which the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these network formation games are stable. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775370
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Insurance Games.
Suijs, J. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
This paper generalizes the results of Suijs, De Waegenaere and Borm (1998) to arbitrary risks. It provides Pareto optimal allocations and shows that the zero utility premium calculation principle yields a core-allocation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775386
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Price Uncertainty in Linear Production Situations.
Suijs, J. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
This paper analyzes linear production situations with price uncertainty, and shows that the corresponding stochastic linear production games are totally balanced. It also shows that investment funds, where investors pool their individual capital for joint investments in financial assets, fit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775393
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On the Nucleous of Neighbour Games.
Klijn, F.; Vermeulen, D.; Hamers, H.; Solymosi, T.; Tijs, S. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
The class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (cf. Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component additive games (cf. Curiel et al. (1994)). For assignment games and component additive games there exist polynomially bounded algorithms or order p4 for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775427
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Weighted Constrained Egalitarism in TU-Games.
Koster, M. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TU-games is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987, 1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005775442
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Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution.
Klijn, F.; Vermeulen, D.; Hamers, H.; Solymosi, T.; Tijs, S. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
Neighbour games arise from certain matching or sequencing situations in which only some specific pairs of players can obtain a positive gain. As a consequence, the class of neighbour games is the intersection of the class of assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1972)) and the class of component...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005660467
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Governance of Clubs and Firms with Cultural Dimensions.
van den Brink, R.; Ruys, P.H.M.; Semenov, R. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
The neoclassical way to cope with firms providing services, or with clubs procuring services, is restricted by the lack of institutional features. An institutional approach is introduced that requires a cooperative governance to realize the potential value-production by firms, or to realize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005660512
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An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value Using a Fairness Property.
van den Brink, R. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoofs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618576
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Voluntary Contribution to Multiple Public Projects.
Koster, M.; Reijnierse, H.; Voorneveld, M. - CentER for Economic Research, Universiteit van Tilburg - 1999
The problem of financing a set of public goods (facilities, projects) by private contributions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game, is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618590