This paper investigates the mechanisms that firms use to get state favors. We focus on a less well studied but common mechanism: business owners seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that business owners who rely on government concessions or are wealthier...

We analyse controlling owners incentive to provide non-controlling owners with better protection against self-dealing through offering new shares with tag-along rights, - the private contracting alternative to equal price provision in takeover legislation. Our model identifies two counteracting...

We investigate how predatory government policies (expropriation, lack of property rights protection, corruption, crime) interact with managerial incentives in shaping firm governance structure. Our model shows that owners have lower incentives to encourage valuemaximization by managers if the...

This study investigates the capital structure and investment activities of listed companies on the Hanoi Securities Exchange and the Ho Chi Minh Securities Exchange in Vietnam. Estimation analysis using panel data covering the four-year period 2006-2009 revealed the following results. (1)...

In a large sample of European firms we analyze the value discount associated with disproportional ownership structures first documented by Claessens et al (2002). Consistent with a theoretical model of incentives and entrenchment effects, we find higher value discount in family firms, in firms...

The statistically typical form of the board of directors in a Russian joint-stock corporation can be characterized as an open managerial supervisory body with a balanced membership of executive corporate officers and outsider directors. In reality, however, there are only a very limited number...

This paper shows that pyramidal ownership can be used to control downside risk. The research setting is Thailand before and after the 1997 Asian crisis. The focus is on family business groups that owned banks. The results show that the controlling family pursues different investment strategies...

We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system since the 1990s. Following Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2001), we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our...

We study the evolution of the control structure for a large sample of privatized firms in OECD countries and find evidence broadly consistent with the concept of "reluctant privatization", defined as the transfer of ownership rights in State-owned enterprises without a corresponding transfer of...

This paper investigates the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and non-price loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants and performance pricing) are more favorable and syndicated loans comprise more...