We develop and test the hypothesis that private information incorporated into stock prices affects the structure of corporate boards. Stock price informativeness may be a complement to board monitoring, because the information revealed by prices can be used by directors to monitor management....

We argue that the size and composition of corporate boards are determined by tradeoffs involving the information that directors bring to boards versus the coordination costs and free rider problems associated with their additions to boards. Our hypotheses lead to predictions that firm size and...

The statistically typical form of the board of directors in a Russian joint-stock corporation can be characterized as an open managerial supervisory body with a balanced membership of executive corporate officers and outsider directors. In reality, however, there are only a very limited number...

After over a decade of sluggish economic growth accompanied by massive fiscal stimulus and government handouts (not unlike the response to the current global crisis) in the 1990s, it remains an open question whether and how Japanese firms have restructured their operations, and whether these...

We analyze related party transactions between Chinese publicly listed firms and their stateowned enterprise (SOEs) shareholders to examine whether companies benefit from the presence of government shareholders and politically connected directors appointed by the government. We find that related...

Firms have a choice: grow through internal investment, or grow through acquisition. While internal growth takes time, an acquisition provides cash flows immediately, as the acquirer benefits from the investments of previous owners. The opportunity to grow internally affects the price of an...

Market size structure refers to the distribution of shares of different size classes of local market participants, where the sizes are inclusive of assets both within and outside the local market. We apply this new measure of market structure in two empirical analyses of the U.S. banking...

We examine the pyramidal ownership structure of a large sample of newly listed Chinese companies controlled by local governments or private entrepreneurs. Both types of the owners use layers of intermediate companies to control their firms. However, their pyramiding behaviors are likely affected...

This paper investigates the mechanisms that firms use to get state favors. We focus on a less well studied but common mechanism: business owners seeking election to top office. Using Thailand as a research setting, we find that business owners who rely on government concessions or are wealthier...

Although some argue that tokenism drives the selection of female directors, we show that they have a significant impact on measures of board effectiveness. In a large panel of data on publicly-traded firms from 1996-2003, we find that (1) the likelihood that a female director has attendance...