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Choice screen auctions have been recently deployed in 31 European countries, allowing consumers to choose their preferred search engine on Google's Android platform instead of being automatically defaulted to Google's own search engine. I show that a seemingly minor detail in the design of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012482310
We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013334437
incorporates both differential information and the fact that bids placed in timber auctions are multidimensional. The theory … predicts that bidders will strategically distort their bids based on their private information, a practice known as 'skewed … tract characteristics, we test our model and provide evidence that bidders do possess private information. Our results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471603
distributions governing bidder demand and information. An active literature has developed aiming to estimate these primitives by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466543
they occur. For a given sequence of orders from a continuous electronic limit order book market, matching orders using one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012480285
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heterogeneous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set of systematic effects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation towards these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464059
that adaptation costs on average account for about ten percent of the winning bid. The distortions from private information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466618
We examine the bidding behavior of firms competing on ERCOT, the hourly electricity balancing market in Texas. We characterize an equilibrium model of bidding into this uniform-price divisible-good auction market. Using detailed firm-level data on bids and marginal costs of generation, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467562
This paper proposes an estimation method for a repeated auction game under the presence of capacity contraints. The estimation strategy is computationally simple as it does not require solving for the equilibrium of the game. It uses a two stage approach. In the first stage the distribution of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470090
This paper studies federal auctions for wildcat leases on the Outer Continental Shelf from 1954 to 1970. These are leases where bidders privately acquire (at some cost) noisy, but equally informative, signals about the amount of oil and gas that may be present. We develop a test of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470430