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Corporate Governance for Crooks? The Case for Corporate Virtue
Osterloh, Margit; Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
Corporate scandals are reflected in excessive top management compensation and fraudulent accounts. These scandals cause an enormous amount of damage, not only to the companies affected, but also to the market economy as a whole. As a solution, conventional wisdom suggests more monitoring and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760916
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Withering academia?
Frey, Bruno S. - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2010
, increased division of labor in research, intense publication pressure, academic fraud, dilution of the concept of “university …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008672224
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Incomplete and asymmetric surplus information in labor relations
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike (contributor);  … - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001871121
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Effort and selection effects of incentive contracts
Bouwens, Jan (contributor); Lent, Laurence van (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001900164
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(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static andDynamic Bargaining Experiments
Fischer, Sven; González Morales, Luis G.; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005
A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602
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Measuring the Degree of Ambiguity about Probability: Experimental Evidence
Morone, Andrea; Özdemir, Özlem - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005
This paper aims to experimentally investigate how individual willingness to pay for a lottery is affected by using a new way of representing of probabilistic ambiguity. Thus we can see how individual valuation reacts to different degrees of ambiguity probability information provided to subjects....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866670
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Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies
Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …
. We report the results of a series ofexperiments. The first experiment is designed as a straightforward theory … symmetric networks. Collusion cannot account for the observed behavior. In our second experiment we reject the conjecture that … two-stage game. Finally, in our third experiment we reduce the complexity of the setting by transforming the original two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866674
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The Regulation of Nonpoint Emissions in the Laboratory:A Stress Test of the Ambient Tax Mechanism
Boun My, Kene; Cochard, François; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …
We investigate the ability of the damage based tax mechanism to induce socially optimal outcomes in a controlled laboratory environment which incorporates important aspects of nonpoint pollution problems. Our experimental setting combines a strictly convex damage function with uncertainty in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866677
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Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Gameswith Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs
Fischer, Sven - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005
Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680
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Strategic Delay and Rational Imitation in the Laboratory
Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Boun My, Kene; VERGNAUD, JEAN; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …
This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866694