This paper presents an endogenous growth model where, in line with the recent em- pirical evidence, the telecommunications industry (telecom) is an engine of growth. In such a framework, this paper analyzes the channels through which telecom con- tributes to economic growth and focuses on market...

We study the economic impacts of the interaction between a regulator's Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection policy against software piracy on the one side and the forms of IPR protection that software producers may themselves undertake to protect their intellectual property on the other...

Two software developers, each offering a product variety of different (exogenously given) quality, compete in prices for heterogeneous users who choose from purchasing a legal version, using an illegal copy, and not using a product at all. Using an illegal version violates intellectual property...

In this paper we empirically show that a more intensive use and wider adoption of telecommunication technologies significantly increases the level of product market competition in services and goods markets. Our result is consistent with the view that the use of telecommunication technologies...

We study how the strength of public intellectual property rights (IPR) protection against software piracy (copyright protection) affects private IPR protection (that software developers may themselves undertake to protect their IPR). There are two software developers that offer a product variety...

As part of the Single Market Program the European Commission commanded the liberalization and regulatory harmonization of utilities, transport and telecommunication services. This paper investigates whether and how this process affected the productivity of European network firms. Exploiting the...

In the paper, I examine free entry in homogeneous product markets and its social efficiency. Previous research on free entry in homogeneous product markets has shown that under Cournot oligopoly with fixed setup costs the free entry equilibrium always delivers excessive entry. In contrast, I...

To prevent possible abuse of market power in the future an antitrust agency can force merging firms to divest some of their assets. The divested assets can be sold via auction either to existing competitors or to a new entrant. Divesture of assets extends the range of parameters when a merger...

When a bidder (referred to as the privileged bidder) is residual claimant to a part of the revenue from an auction with two bidders whose valuations are independently and identically distributed, bidding incentives are changed. Specifically, the privileged bidder will bid more aggressively to...

I compare certification and self-regulation, two widely used quality assurance mechanisms in markets where consumers do not observe the quality of goods. Certification is a mechanism in which an external firm oers a certificate to producers who undergo a testing procedure, issues the certificate...