Similar Search Results

The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - Center for Financial Studies - 2005

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986443

The Dynamics of Venture Capital Contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - Center for Financial Studies - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005120787

Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors : the impact of reputation and bargaining power on contractual design

Schmidt, Daniel (contributor); Wahrenburg, Mark (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001919095

Insuring the uninsurable: brokers and incomplete insurance contracts

Doherty, Neil A.; Muermann, Alexander - Center for Financial Studies - 2005

How do markets spread risk when events are unknown or unknowable and where not anticipated in an insurance contract? While the policyholder can hold up the insurer for extra contractual payments, the continuing gains from trade on a single contract are often too small to yield useful coverage....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986457

Contractual relations between European VC-funds and investors: The impact of reputation and bargaining power on contractual design

Schmidt, Daniel; Wahrenburg, Mark - Center for Financial Studies - 2003

reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more … participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant … money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958770

Contractual Relations between European VC–Funds and Investors: The Impact of Reputation and Bargaining Power on Contractual Design

Schmidt, Daniel; Wahrenburg, Mark - Center for Financial Studies - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005022453

Insuring the Uninsurable: Brokers and Incomplete Insurance Contracts

Doherty, Neil A.; Muermann, Alexander - Center for Financial Studies - 2005

How do markets spread risk when events are unknown or unknowable and where not anticipated in an insurance contract? While the policyholder can "hold up" the insurer for extra contractual payments, the continuing gains from trade on a single contract are often too small to yield useful coverage....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005600441