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Multiple-bank lending: Diversification and free-riding in monitoring

Cerasi, Vittoria; Daltung, Sonja - Center for Financial Studies - 2004

and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit … of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of efforts … less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase monitoring costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986458

Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring

Carletti, Elena; Cerasi, Vittoria; Daltung, Sonja - Center for Financial Studies - 2004

firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the … benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher monitoring dominates the costs of free-riding and duplication of efforts … less profitable, and poor financial integration, regulation and inefficient judicial systems increase monitoring costs …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005138839

Mergers and acquisitions in Germany : social-setting and regulatory framework

Schmid, Frank A. (contributor); Wahrenburg, Mark (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001817426

Blockholder dispersion and firm value

Konijn, Sander J. J.; Kräussl, Roman; Lucas, André - Center for Financial Studies - 2010

This paper analyzes the impact of blockownership dispersion on firm value. Blockholdings by multiple blockholders is a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. market. It is not clear, however, whether dispersion among blockholder is preferable to having a more concentrated ownership structure. To test...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986382

Governance und Vertragsstrukturen in der deutschen VC Industrie: Eine empirische Einschätzung

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia; Walz, Uwe - Center for Financial Studies - 2008

Diese Arbeit analysiert die wesentlichen Elemente der Vertragsstrukturen in der Venture Capital-Industrie. Aufbauend auf einem sehr umfangreichen und detaillierten Datensatz, der die Verträge zwischen Venture Capital-Investoren und deren Portfoliounternehmen abbildet, werden die Kontroll-,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986442

The dynamics of venture capital contracts

Bienz, Carsten; Hirsch, Julia - Center for Financial Studies - 2005

We analyze the degree of contract completeness with respect to staging of venture capital investments using a hand-collected German data set of contract data from 464 rounds into 290 entrepreneurial firms. We distinguish three forms of staging (pure milestone financing, pure round financing and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986443

Universal Banks and Relationships with Firms

Elsas, Ralf; Krahnen, Jan Pieter - Center for Financial Studies - 2003

believed to play a special role as large and informed monitoring investors (shareholders). However, for the very same reasons … small and medium sized companis throughout. With respect to the role of banks as monitoring investors, the evidence does not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986500

Dividend policy, corporate control and tax clienteles: The case of Germany

Andres, Christian; Betzer, André; Goergen, Marc - Center for Financial Studies - 2011

This paper studies the impact of the concentration of control, the type of controlling shareholder and the dividend tax preference of the controlling shareholder on dividend policy for a panel of 220 German firms over 1984-2005. While the concentration of control does not have an effect on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958493

Why do contracts differ between VC types? Market segmentation versus corporate governance varieties

Hirsch, Julia; Walz, Uwe - Center for Financial Studies - 2006

The main objective of the present paper is to disentangle observed differences in the design of contracts across VC types into firm selection effects and corporate governance differences between VC types (different contracts). Based on a theoretical approach developed in the first part of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958526

Legality and venture governance around the world

Cumming, Douglas; Schmidt, Daniel; Walz, Uwe - Center for Financial Studies - 2004

We analyze governance with a dataset on investments of venture capitalists in 3848 portfolio firms in 39 countries from North and South America, Europe and Asia spanning 1971-2003. We find that cross-country differences in Legality have a significant impact on the governance structure of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958559