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Multiple-bank lending: Diversification and free-riding in monitoring
Cerasi, Vittoria; Daltung, Sonja - Center for Financial Studies - 2004
This paper analyzes banks choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986458
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Multiple-bank lending: diversification and free-riding in monitoring
Carletti, Elena; Cerasi, Vittoria; Daltung, Sonja - Center for Financial Studies - 2004
This paper analyzes banks’ choice between lending to firms individually and sharing lending with other banks, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending is optimal whenever the benefit of greater diversification in terms of higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005138839
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Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending: An empirical study on financial contracting
Elsas, Ralf; Krahnen, Jan Pieter - Center for Financial Studies - 2000
ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for … lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the … borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958616
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Collateral, relationship lending and financial distress: An empirical study on financial contracting
Elsas, Ralf; Krahnen, Jan Pieter - Center for Financial Studies - 2002
This paper analyses the role of collateral in loan contracting when companies are financed by multiple bank lenders and … the view that collateral is a strategic instrument intended to influence the bargaining position of banks. Our result …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958813
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Hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy
Bertola, Giuseppe; Koeniger, Winfried - Center for Financial Studies - 2013
We consider an economy where individuals privately choose effort and trade competitively priced securities that pay off with effort-determined probability. We show that if insurance against a negative shock is sufficiently incomplete, then standard functional formrestrictions ensure that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958729
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Hidden regret in insurance markets: Adverse and advantageous selection
Huang, Rachel J.; Muermann, Alexander; Tzeng, Larry Y. - Center for Financial Studies - 2008
positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse … coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986404
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Public policy and venture capital financed innovation: A contract design approach
Hirsch, Julia - Center for Financial Studies - 2006
The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard doublesided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analyzing their impact on contract design. We show that in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958733
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Is the Behavior of German Venture Capitalists Different? Evidence from the Neuer Mark
Tykvová, Tereza - Center for Financial Studies - 2003
Using a unique, hand-collected database of all venture-backed firms listed on Germany´s Neuer Markt, we analyze the history of venture capital financing of these firms before the IPO and the behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO. We can detect significant differences in the behavior and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986397
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Public Policy and Venture Capital Financed Innovation: A Contract Design Approach
Hirsch, Julia - Center for Financial Studies - 2006
The effects of public policy programs which aim at internalizing spill-overs due to successful innovation are analyzed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard doublesided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analyzing their impact on contract design. We show that in our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005120780
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Collateralised loan obligations (CLOs): A primer
Jobst, Andreas A. - Center for Financial Studies - 2002
transfer of credit risk will be considered, so that we can equally privilege the critical aspects of security design in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010958689