Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and nondictatorship principles are...

This paper studies a class of social welfare relations (SWRs) on the set of infinite utility streams. In particular, we examine the SWRs satisfying Q-Anonymity, an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity, as well as Strong Pareto and a certain equity axiom. First, we characterize the...

This paper studies the extensions of the infinte-horizon variants of the leximin principle and utilitarianism on the set of infinite utility streams. We especially examine those extensions which satisfy the axiom of Preference-continuity (or Consistency) and the extended anonymity axiom called...

In a recent paper ["Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice," Economic Journal, Vol. 109, 1999, pp. 204-220], Suzumura proposed a possible way of relating the two schools of "new" welfare economics. According to his proposal, the logical possibility of the Paretian "new" welfare...

In a seminal contribution, Hansson has demonstrated that the family of decisive coalitions associated with an Arrovian social welfare function forms an ultrafilter. If the population under consideration is infinite, his result implies the existence of nondictatorial social welfare functions. He...

We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple technology. Efficiency and time consistency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen,...

Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans' theory of impatience into Arrow's social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. We prove that the negative implications of their...

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms. We introduce a concept of norm-conditional...

Ranking infinite utility streams includes many impossibility results, most involving certain Pareto, anonymity, or continuity requirements. We introduce the concept of the future agreement extension, a method that explicitly extends orderings on finite time horizon to an infinite time horizon....

In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that Arrow's axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto...