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Wealth as a Signal in the Search Model of Money

Okumura, Tsunao - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2005

This paper investigates the possibility that wealth (holdings of money) serves as a signal of ability to produce high quality products for agents who cannot directly observe the quality of the products. A producer’s wealth may advertise past success in selling products to agents who knew the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588737

Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets

Atakan, Alp; Ekmekci, Mehmet - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2010

In a two-sided search market agents are paired to bargain over a unit surplus. The matching market serves as an endogenous outside option for agents in a bargaining relationship. Behavioral agents are (strategically inflexible) commitment types that demand a constant portion of the unit surplus....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804605

Intermediation in Search Markets

Gehrig, Thomas - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1993

In markets, in which exchange requires costly search for trading partners, intermediaries can help to reduce the trading frictions. This intuition is modelled in a framework with heterogeneous agents, who have the chocie between intermediated exchange and search accompanied by some bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766751

Competitive Equilibria in Decentralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Atakan, Alp E. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2006

This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a decentralized dynamic matching market with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety converge to competitive equilibria. Each buyer wants to purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588293

The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms

Shneyerov, Artyom; Won, Adam Chi Leung - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2008

We study the steady state of a market with incoming cohorts of buyers and sellers who are matched pairwise and bargain under private information. We first consider generalized random-proposer take-it-or-leave-it offer games (GRP TIOLI games). This class of games includes a simple random-proposer...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588327

When are Signals Complements or Substitutes

Borgers, Tilman; Hernanco-Veciana, Angel; Krohmer, Daniel - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2010

The paper introduces a notion of complementarity (substitutability) of two signals which requires that in all decision … characterization which relates complementarity and substitutability to a Blackwell comparison of two auxiliary signals. In a setting … of complementarity and substitutability. We demonstrate how these conditions extend to more general settings. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584614

Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses

Loertscher, Simon; Niedermayer, Andras - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2008

Mechanisms where intermediaries charge a commission fee and have the sellers set the price are widely used in practice e.g. by real estate agents, stock brokers, art galleries, or auction houses. We model competition between intermediaries in a dynamic random matching model, where in every...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824584

Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited

Kalai, Adam; Kalai, Ehud - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2011

For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This conuence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Rai¤a, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010592134

Cooperation in Strategic Games Revisited

Kalai, Adam; Kalai, Ehud - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2011

For two-person complete-information strategic games with transferable utility, all major variable-threat bargaining and arbitration solutions coincide. This confluence of solutions by luminaries such as Nash, Harsanyi, Raiffa, and Selten, is more than mere coincidence. Staying in the class of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008804919

The Dynamics of Distributive Politics

Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2007

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is generated by a random recognition rule, the committee chooses between the proposal and a status quo by majority rule, and the voting outcome in period t becomes the status quo...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766851