Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian or correlated equilibrium to analysis of strategic interaction, requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games, and subjective Nash...

Global games are real-valued functions defined on partitions (rather than subsets) of the set of players. They capture "public good" aspects of cooperation, i.e. situations where the payoff is naturally defined for all players ("the globe") together, as is the cause with issues of environmental...

Under the rational expectation s assumption of Muth, economic agents use their perfect knowledge of the distribution of future prices to compute optimal current actions. In private forecasts equilibrium, intorduced here, agents use subjective in accurate forecasts about future prices to compute...

We study merging, in a few senses, of two measures when increasing sequence of information is observed. Motivating this extension of Blackwell and Dubins' (1962) work, are studies of convergence to equilibrium in infinite games and in dynamic economies.

A player's strategy, for an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, is subjectively rational if it is a best response to his individual beliefs regarding opponents' strategies. A vector of such strategies is a subjective equilibrium if the play induced by it is realization equivalent...

We deal with the concept of e-consistent equilibrium which corresponds to strategies inducing an e-equilbrium in any subgame reached along the play path. Examples and existence conditions are given.

At a private-beliefs equilibrium of an n-person infinitely repeated game with discounting, each player maximizes his expected payoff relative to some private, possibly false, belief regarding the strategies chosen by his opponents. Moreover, the probability distribution induced over the observed...