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We analyze in a game between a patient player 1 and a non-myopic but less patient opponent, player 2. We assume that Player 1's type is private information and that players do not directly observe each other's action but rather see an imperfect signal of it. We show that in any Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824443
I study the optimal supply of exible commitment devices to people who value both commitment and exibility, and whose …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008866079
We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when the buyer may present evidence relevant to the buyer's value, or when different types of buyer have a differential ability to communicate. We introduce a dynamic bargaining protocol in which the buyer first makes a sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009246715
We develop a theory of price discrimination in many-to-many matching markets in which agents’ preferences are vertically and horizontally differentiated. The optimal plans induce negative assortative matching at the margin: agents with a low value for interacting with other agents are included...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630725
rationalized in a voting model with diverse constituents. One would think that commitment to finishing the metro line (no matter …, when commitment is needed). More generally, we prove a theorem for binary-choice trees and arbitrary learning, establishing … that no plan of action which is majority-preferred to the equilibrium play without commitment can be a Condorcet winner …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010631779